Biological weapons are using infectious agents or biological toxins to infect organisms with the intent of harming or killing them. These weapons are viruses or living organisms which replicate, and have the ability to infect a single or multiple humans. These weapons are used offensively. Defensively used against these weapons are countermeasures that involve recognition, diagnosis, and treatment of the disease (Newman, 2018).

There are many possible ways of exposure of exposure to biological agents, including bombs and grenades containing the agent, aerosol sprays, brushes for contaminating surfaces, by injection, and by food contamination (CDC, 2015). According to Johns Hopkins Centre for Public Health Awareness (n.d), there are three classes of potential biological weapons: A, B, and C. The classifications are ranked in order of severity of the potential health impact based on the type of agent, mode of delivery, lethality, and potential to cause disruption.

Class A biological weapons are given the highest priority. This is because they have the highest potential for dissemination and can cause the highest mortality rates in comparison to class B or C. Additionally, they require the greatest amount of public health preparation. A popular example of a class A biological weapon is Anthrax, however there are many others listed such as; botulism, plague, tularemia, small pox and viral hemorrhagic fevers (CDC, 2015).

Anthrax is a serious infectious disease caused by Bacillus anthracis bacteria. The bacteria is rod-like, as shown in Figure 1, and forms bacterial spores, commonly affecting wild animals through contaminated soil and water. Humans contract the disease through consumption of contaminated animal products. Anthrax is rare but is more common in countries that do not have public health programs that routinely vaccinate animals against anthrax (CDC, 2015).

Figure 1. Rod-like Bacillus anthracis bacteria (Infection Landscapes, 2013)

After WWII, 103 countries signed a treaty designed to eliminate the use of anthrax as a weapon. However, some countries and terrorist groups still develop B anthracis as an agent of mass destruction (CDC, 2015). The true extent of the threat of anthrax is difficult to evaluate. The production of the agent is extremely difficult due to the size and number of spores required to cause an outbreak, and many previous attempts have been unsuccessful. (Tasota, Henker, and Hoffman, 2002).

Pathogenesis

When inside a host organism, the bacterial spores can reside in macrophages and takeover the lymph nodes. The mature bacteria then prevent phagocytosis and freely move around the lymphatic system. The spores can also release edema toxin, affecting water balance and causing swelling. Furthermore, lethal toxin release can stimulate tumour growth factors and cause massive hemorrhage. Thus, these toxins can rapidly cause respiratory distress, sepsis, and meningitis (Tasota, Henker, and Hoffman, 2002).

Class B contain biological weapons that still pose a threat but to a lesser extent than class A. They will result in lower amounts of mortality and require less public preparation. An example of a Class B agent is Salmonella or any other food safety threat (CDC, 2015).

Salmonella is one of many types of food-borne illness. Common symptoms of salmonella are nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Symptoms can sometimes be severe and even be life-threatening, especially if an individual is vulnerable to infection, such as pregnant women and children (CDC, 2018).

Pathogenesis

Salmonella enters the body through food ingestion. However, there are certain requirements for salmonellae to be fully pathogenic. It must have the ability to invade cells, replicate intracellularly, release toxins, and a complete lipopolysaccharide coat. This is a coat that is comprised of fats and carbohydrates and it helps induce an immune response in animals (Raetz & Whitfield, 2002). After passing the gastric acid barrier, it invades the mucus membrane of the small and large intestines and produces toxins. The mechanisms that explain how the epithelial cells are invaded are not fully understood. However, invasion does require an initial binding to specific cell receptors on surface of the intestinal epithelial cells. The initiation of invasion is marked by the pathogen irritating or ‘ruffling’ the intestinal lining cells. That ends up causing pinocytosis of the pathogen. Pinocytosis is also referred to as ‘cell drinking’ where small particles are brought into the cell (Holter, 1959).

After invasion, the epithelial cells release proinflammatory cytokines (Gianella, 1996). Cytokines simply regulate host responses to invasions, infections, immune responses and trauma. Proinflammatory cytokines promote inflammation and can often aid in disease progression. In the case of salmonella, this inflammatory response causes diarrhea and can even lead to ulceration and destruction of the mucus membrane. The salmonella bacteria can also leave the intestines and go on to affect many other organs and tissues (Dinarello, 2002).

When it comes to the usage of biological weapons, numerous ethical and safety concerns arise. As technology continues to progress, the risk of biological weapons being used by non-state parties, individual, or terrorist groups becomes more of a prevalent issue. The use of biological weapons for criminal acts, targeted assassinatiions, or the unintended release of harmful biological agents are indeed possible. (1) Without implementing proper policies, safety measures, and regulations, the likelihood of such criminal or negligent use of biological weapons increase. In a real-world situation, it is difficult to differentiate between the causes for biological weapon usage. When there is an occurence of biological warfare, a network of organizations are involved to mitigate the effects of the biological event. Managing the risks, preparing for damages, or preventing the biological event from happening in the first place is multidisciplinary, multi-sectoral, and coordinated. (1) International, regional, nongovernmental organizations, and other nonproliferation regimes coordinate to respond to biological threats in an optimal manner to ensure safety of as many people as possible. (1)

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was established in 1972, to aid with the existing initiatives dedicated to control for the occurence of biological events. (2) These established initiatives include the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. (2) The BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty. (2) The treaty prohibited the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of weapons under the biological and toxic category. (2) The BWC State parties meet a few times every year in order to maintain the efficacy of these biological safety-, and prevention measures, as well as the BWC’s key provisions. (Figure 2)

Canada is amongst the 170 States to sanction the Biological Weapons Convention, with the government of Canada taking the responsibility to act against biological threats. (4) The Canadian government has implemented multiple laws pertaining to biosafety, biosecurity, non-proliferation, and control of biological materials. (4) As a means of risk management, the Canadian Public Health Agency has implemented the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act to mitigate biological threats. Canada also has a program dedicated to ensuring biological security; helping to identify, prevent, or respond to biological outbreaks. This program, Canada’s WMD Threat Reduction Program, has a multi-disciplinary network that aids in implementing the Convention in other nations. Though there has been no means of checking to see if State Parties’ comply to their treaty obligations, States have agreed to complete an annual CBM, Confidence Building Measure. (4) The CBM serves to enhance compliance, cooperation, and trust within all State Parties.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has implemented logistical processes to counteract the effects of biological threats on human health. From epidemiological investigations, to patient care, to the handling of the pathogenic threat, WHO is prepared to respond. (3) In terms of treatments, such is dependent on the source of the biological threat. Standard procedures have been implemented for known infectious diseases. (3) Oftentimes, infected individuals are quarantined, infections are isolated, and information is shared to nullify the biological threats. (3)

Historical attempts of using diseases in biological warfare illustrates the difficulty of differentiating between a naturally occurring epidemic and an alleged or attempted biological warfare attack—a problem that has continued into present times.

These weapons will become more common in the next decade and has caused a greater amount of research in the United States for defensive weapons by the Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction unit. Supercomputer modeling is a tool that has been used to model the conditions for how the weapon behaves to its environment, and use this information as a defensive strategy. Microbial forensics are another huge field used as a defensive strategy (Demirev, Feldman, & Lin, 2005). Using this method, the scientists can reverse engineer the pathogen and observe the way that it was created. A way to increase defensive strategies is through developing better instruments that can lower the cost of use, be more automated and have a higher sensitivity, but this could also result in more dangerous offensive weapons. However, an increase in defensive weapon technology has a two fold application where researchers are also able to use this information to combat other common diseases such as bird flu (Demirev, Feldman, & Lin, 2005). This has caused the creation of remote and biological agent point sensors. Mostly all remote sensors detect chemical or biological aerosols with some having the ability to detect pathogens up to 10 kilometers away. These machines have a low specificity meant for quick detection and collect information such as cloud density and spatial distribution. The most promising form of biological point sensors is nucleic acid-based sensors. However, using this type of sample requires you to have a sample to test rather than just a general area like remote sensors. Nucleic acid sensors amplify DNA using PCR and map out the genomes for specific common threats. After having this model created, the scientists are able to compare their sample to one of the genomes mapped out, and use this to identify what pathogen is present (Demirev, Feldman, & Lin, 2005).

The new offensive weapons are primarily being engineered for harder detection and treatment. Another possibility is that the pathogen can disguise itself as something else preventing easy diagnosis by a healthcare professional. Biological weapons may become more customizable in the future, being able to target specific areas of a person, and creating a predictable result (Petro, Plasse, & McNulty, 2003). One researcher stated that countries may only be five years away from scientists creating a pathogen for a certain group that has a low chance of being detected before it has already spread in that population. There is also the idea of “stealth” viruses which would be introduced into the genome of a certain population, and trigger a disease through a specific signal. There could also be “designer” diseases where cell death could be triggered throughout the body based on the multiple pathways that it effects. Weapons could be created based off of plant inoculants which are currently used in agriculture, or even use worldwide databases which contain the genetic information of different populations (Fraser & Dando, 2001).

CDC. (2015). Anthrax. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/basics/index.html

CDC. (2018). Food Borne Illness and Germs. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html

Demirev, P. A., Feldman, A. B., & Lin, J. S. (2005). Chemical and biological weapons: current concepts for future defenses. Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 26(4), 321-333.

Dinarello, C. A. (2000). Proinflammatory cytokines. Chest, 118(2), 503-508.

Fraser, C. M., & Dando, M. R. (2001). Genomics and future biological weapons: the need for preventive action by the biomedical community. Nature genetics, 29(3), 253.

Giannella, R. A. (1996). Chapter 21: Salmonella. Medical microbiology, 4.

Holter, H. (1959). Pinocytosis. In International review of cytology (Vol. 8, pp. 481-504). Academic Press.

Infection Landscapes. (2013). Anthrax. Retrieved from http://www.infectionlandscapes.org/2013/08/anthrax.html.

John’s Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness (n.d). Biological Weapons. Retrieved from https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-public-health-preparedness/tips/topics/Biologic_Weapons/BioWeapons.html

Newman, T. (2018, February 28). Biological weapons and bioterrorism: Past, present, and future. Retrieved from https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321030.php

Petro, J. B., Plasse, T. R., & McNulty, J. A. (2003). Biotechnology: impact on biological warfare and biodefense. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1(3), 161-168.

Raetz, C. R., & Whitfield, C. (2002). Lipopolysaccharide endotoxins. Annual review of biochemistry, 71(1), 635-700.

Tasota, F. J., Henker, R. A., & Hoffman, L. A. (2002). Anthrax as a biological weapon: an old disease that poses a new threat. Critical care nurse, 22(5), 21-34.